DAMAGE ABATEMENT AND COMPENSATION PROGRAMS AS INCENTIVES FOR WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT ON PRIVATE LAND by Yoder, Jonathan K.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Human Conflicts with Wildlife: Economic 
Considerations 
USDA National Wildlife Research Center 
Symposia 
August 2000 
DAMAGE ABATEMENT AND COMPENSATION PROGRAMS AS 
INCENTIVES FOR WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT ON PRIVATE LAND 
Jonathan K. Yoder 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nwrchumanconflicts 
 Part of the Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons 
Yoder, Jonathan K., "DAMAGE ABATEMENT AND COMPENSATION PROGRAMS AS INCENTIVES FOR 
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT ON PRIVATE LAND" (2000). Human Conflicts with Wildlife: Economic 
Considerations. 2. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nwrchumanconflicts/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the USDA National Wildlife Research Center Symposia at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Conflicts with 
Wildlife: Economic Considerations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - 
Lincoln. 
16
HUMAN CONFLICTS WITH WILDLIFE: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
17
DAMAGE ABATEMENT AND COMPENSATION 
PROGRAMS AS INCENTIVES FOR WILDLIFE 
MANAGEMENT ON PRIVATE LAND 
JONATHAN K. YODER 
Abstract: Public damage abatement and compensation programs may be used to alter private incentives for damage abatement 
and habitat provision. A model is developed that explains the economic logic behind prevalent characteristics of public wildlife 
damage programs. The model is supported with an examination of a broad cross-section of wildlife agency policy and law. The 
model can be used by wildlife managers and policy makers as a conceptual framework for understanding the incentive effects 
of compensation and abatement policy. 
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Wildlife imposes costs on landowners in the form 
of crop damage, livestock depredation, and damage to 
a wide variety of other productive capital. Fifty-five 
percent of agricultural producers in the United States 
reported some level of wildlife damage in 1989, and 
total estimated damage for the country was as high as 
US$1.26 billion (Wywialowski 1994). Agricultural land-
owners provide much of the wildlife habitat throughout 
the United States and the world, and wildlife-inflicted 
property damage may provide incentives to reduce the 
quantity and quality of habitat on private land.
Most state wildlife agencies maintain some form 
of program to address wildlife damage to agricultural 
property (Lueck 1989, Lueck and Yoder 1997). Two cen-
tral elements of most programs are abatement support 
and compensation. Abatement support takes the form of 
agency consultation services, abatement activities per-
formed by agency personnel at landowners’ request, 
and subsidies for abatement capital such as fences 
and dispersal devices. Approximately 25 state and pro-
vincial agencies in the United States and Canada main-
tain compensation programs, which provide reimburse-
ment for damage sustained by agricultural landowners 
(Wagner et al. 1997). Compensation is usually available 
for damage inflicted on specific property types, and by 
specific wildlife species. In return for compensation, 
agencies often place requirements on landowner abate-
ment, land-use practices, and hunting access. 
Compensation and abatement programs are also 
maintained by at least one private environmental group, 
as well as various public wildlife agencies worldwide. 
Defenders of Wildlife currently offers compensation to 
livestock producers near Yellowstone National Park who 
suffer depredation from reintroduced wolves, and for 
grizzly bear predation around Glacier National Park. 
From 1987 to February 2000, Defenders of Wildlife has 
compensated 113 ranchers a total of US$112,107 for 149 
lost cattle, 319 lost sheep, and 14 other units of livestock 
(Defenders of Wildlife 2000). 
Wagner et al. (1997) provide a summary of wild-
life compensation programs. They also list 6 possible 
motivations for damage compensation programs: 1) to 
account for severe losses that may threaten the liveli-
hood of agricultural producers, 2) to address common 
problems involving a large proportion of citizens, 3) 
to offset restrictions on abatement tools due to animal 
rights concerns, 4) to address wildlife problems made 
more severe by management actions taken by govern-
ment agencies, 5) to address recently emerging or 
increasingly more severe wildlife damage problems, and 
6) to address problems caused by highly valued species. 
The authors came to the conclusion that motives 4, 5, 
and 6 are likely explanations for the use of compensa-
tion programs, but provide no underlying conceptual 
model for understanding why compensation programs 
are appropriate. 
This paper examines compensation and abate-
ment programs as a means of contracting over wildlife 
management on private land. A model is developed that 
sheds light on the economic structure of compensation 
and abatement programs, and the motivation for main-
taining these programs as a contracting tool. The model 
is based on 2 fundamental assumptions: 1) that wildlife 
damage law and policy is designed as if to maximize the 
net value of wildlife populations, and 2) that landown-
ers are in a unique position of control for managing 
wildlife on their land, regardless of how the legal rights 
to utilize and/or regulate wildlife are distributed. The 
implications of the model are then examined in the 
context of compensation and abatement programs in 
the United States and Canada. The model is generally 
consistent with the findings and conclusions of Wagner 
et al. (1997) outlined in the previous paragraph, and 
thus provides a conceptual framework for understand-
ing and addressing wildlife damage on private land and 
to private property in general. 
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THEORY 
For modeling purposes, a clear distinction will be 
made between the beneficiaries of the wildlife stock 
and the owners of wildlife habitat. Assume 2 specialized 
producers: 1 farmer who produces crops and owns 
the land upon which the wildlife range, and a neighbor-
ing wildlife manager who values the wildlife for hunt-
ing and non-consumptive uses. This distinction allows a 
relatively simple comparison between economically effi-
cient (net-value-maximizing) levels of hunting pressure 
by hunters and damage abatement by farmers and pri-
vate incentives for hunting and damage abatement. This 
comparison between private and social optima then 
forms the foundation for an analysis of the factors that 
inhibit efficient hunting and abatement levels and shape 
wildlife damage policy.
Independent action and efficiency: a comparison 
Consider first the objectives and choices of the 
farmer and the wildlife manager when acting indepen-
dently. The farmer’s objective is to minimize damage by 
utilizing an abatement input x : 
V f = ma
x
x(1 - δ(x; h))y – cx,  (1)
where y is potential (before damage) revenue from 
farming, δ (·) ε (0, 1) is the damage rate, and c is the mar-
ginal cost of abatement. Hunting effort h by the wildlife 
manager is taken as exogenous by the farmer when the 
2 are acting independently. The damage decreases at 
a decreasing rate with respect to abatement in the eco-
nomically relevant range of x : δ
x
 < 0, δ
xx
 > 0 (subscripts 
represent derivatives – e.g., δ
xx 
= ). The first order 
condition for the farmer is 
–yδ
x
– c = 0. (2)
This condition implies that the farmer will set 
x so that the value of reductions in damage from an 
additional unit of x equal the unit cost of x. 
The wildlife manager may benefit from wildlife in 
2 ways: by valuing the flows from the wildlife stock in 
the form of hunting, and by valuing the wildlife stock 
itself. The benefits from hunting and wildlife for the 
wildlife manager will be modeled as
V w = m
h
ax α f (h) + βw(h; x) – rh, (3)
where r is the marginal cost of hunting effort or provi-
sion of hunting services, and α f(h) are hunting benefits 
for a given wildlife stock with α > 0, f
h
 > 0 and f
hh
< 0. 
The value of the wildlife stock is βw(h; x), with β > 
0, w
x
 < 0, w
h
 < 0, and w
hh
 > 0. The value of the stock 
itself (βw) is its net present value for future production 
of hunting services as well as its present value for non-
consumptive uses. This formulation allows recognition 
of the value of future use of the stock without explicitly 
introducing the complications of a dynamic analysis. 
The wildlife manager harvests (hunts) to maxi-
mize this benefit function, subject to the farmer’s abate-





– r = 0.  (4)
This condition implies that the wildlife manager hunts 
to the point that the marginal benefit from hunting 
equals the marginal cost of hunting in terms of reduc-
tions in the wildlife stock and the cost of providing 
hunting services. 
Above, the farmer and the wildlife manager are 
assumed to make their choices independently of each 
other as described, but their choices affect each other: 
hunting affects the damage rate, and abatement affects 
the value of the wildlife stock. As a result, independent 
action will lead to inefficient allocation of these 2 inputs 
because the individuals do not bear the full costs and/or 
benefits of their own actions. For comparison, consider 
joint maximization of the net value of the wildlife stock: 
V = m
h,x
ax αf(h) + βw(h, x) – yδ(x, h) – cx – rh, (5) 
Fig. 1. A comparison of private and optimal abatement and hunting levels.
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COMPENSATION AND ABATEMENT AS INCENTIVES
Hunting and abatement are assumed to be technical 




 > 0. The first-












– c = 0 (6b)
Because hunting pressure and abatement effort are set 
to include their marginal effects on both the value of 
wildlife uses and the damage rate, all effects are inter-
nalized and this result is efficient.
Fig. 1 summarizes the independent and efficient 
results. In both panels, “MB” stands for “marginal ben-
efit,” the benefit accrued from a unit of the effort, and 
“MC” is “marginal cost,” the cost of an additional unit of 
effort. In the left frame, MC farmer is the marginal cost to 
the farmer of the farmer’s abatement, and MC wildlife is the 
loss of value in the wildlife population resulting from an 
additional unit of abatement, and MC social is the vertical 
sum of the two marginal cost curves. Abatement level 
xf represents the farmer’s private optimal abatement 
level, defined by the intersection of MC farmer and MB farmer 
(as required by equation (2)). Abatement level xs rep-
resents the social optimum, which accounts for the 
marginal damage to the wildlife population imposed by 
the farmer’s abatement effort. The same logic underlies 
the right frame of Fig. 1. 
The crucial result of the analysis thus far is that 
when individuals consider only their private benefits 
and costs (not those of others affected by their actions), 
too little hunting, and too much abatement will occur 
relative to social optimum. Thus, to maximize the net 
value of wildlife, hunting pressure should account for 
wildlife-inflicted damage, and damage abatement should 
account for any foregone gains from hunting or wildlife 
viewing. Assuming costless contracting, the gains from 
changing abatement and hunting rates to their respec-
tive efficient levels equals the sum of the 2 triangles 
that lie between the private and socially optimal effort 
levels in Fig. 1. 
Given that the net value of the wildlife stock 
may be increased by altering abatement and hunting 
effort from private levels, the next question, which 
leads directly to policy implications, is how to instigate 
such a change. The following section examines this 
problem in the context of an environment where the 
participants – the landowner and the wildlife manager – 
have incomplete information about the other’s actions, 
and monitoring private actions is difficult and costly. In 
this environment, the form of contract (law or policy) 
will be determined to a large extent by the nature 
of the information deficiencies and contracting costs 
associated with implementing a contract. 
WILDLIFE DAMAGE POLICY: CONSTRAINTS AND 
ALTERNATIVES 
The above analysis is based on the implicit 
assumption that the farmer effectively has the right to 
perform any type of abatement at any level, and the 
wildlife manager effectively has the right to set the 
hunting rate. No other property rights to wildlife are 
specified. In reality, state and federal governments in 
the United States hold legal jurisdiction over wildlife, 
and they enforce restrictions over actions that affect the 
value of the wildlife stock such as harassment, hunting, 
and trapping. This legal arrangement can be viewed as 
a contractual response to overharvesting that evolved 
through common law into specialized game agencies. 
(Lueck and Yoder 1997). 
Legal jurisdiction, however, is not synonymous 
with complete control over a resource. In reality, infor-
mation about private land use practices is not costlessly 
available to public wildlife managers. This means that 
enforcement and control of the use of wildlife resources 
on private land will be costly and incomplete. The value 
of a given form of contractual arrangement (policy or 
law) for managing wildlife depends in part on how 
costly it is to induce a given contracted change in 
resource allocation. 
The model presented above will now be extended 
with the following additional maintained hypothesis: 
the farmers’ abatement labor effort is likely to be among 
the most difficult activities to monitor by the wildlife 
manager. Trespass laws and specific knowledge about 
the landholding and surrounding area provide landown-
ers with a substantial information advantage about the 
abatement effort and use of their own land. The poten-
tial for hidden abatement action (or inaction) makes 
contract enforcement difficult and costly for labor 
contracts in general, and is the basis for a vast 
literature on contract structure applied to a wide vari-
ety of problems. Empirical analyses include Leffler and 
Rucker (1991, timber contracts), Allen and Lueck (1992 
1993, cropshare contracts) and Knoeber (1989, broiler 
chicken production). 
Consider an illustration of this problem. Suppose 
that the wildlife manager agrees to pay the farmer up 
to the full value of the wildlife services lost due to a 
unit of abatement effort in exchange for a unit reduction 
in farmer abatement. In principle, the farmer would 
accept any payment equal to or greater than the mar-
ginal private benefit of abatement, because this is what 
the farmer is giving up by reducing abatement. The 
result would be an equilibrium of xs and a total payment 
to the farmer up to the size of the gray triangle on 
the left-hand panel of Fig. 1. However, for the wildlife 
manager to be willing to pay the farmer, he must be 
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confident that the farmer will in fact reduce abatement 
by that much. To be sure of this, the wildlife manager 
must monitor the farmer’s abatement effort. Honesty 
and integrity of the farmer notwithstanding, the farmer 
still has an economic incentive to perform the abate-
ment he said he wouldn’t perform if there is a chance 
of not being caught. Because monitoring landowner 
abatement labor such as this is particularly difficult and 
costly, there will usually be a substantial possibility of 
not being caught. This problem reduces the value of 
a payment contract based explicitly on farmer abate-
ment labor effort. If monitoring farmer abatement is 
prohibitively costly, the contract would have little or no 
economic value. 
What can be said about wildlife damage policy 
in light of this enforcement problem? Three types of 
contracts (laws and policy) over wildlife damage are 
common, and they will be examined in detail with 
the support of the model: 1) landowner exceptions to 
general regulations on harassing and killing wildlife,1 
2) wildlife agency abatement support, and 3) compensa-
tion programs. These contracting instruments are not 
mutually exclusive. Each has its comparative advantages 
as incentive instruments, each of them has weaknesses, 
and all 3 or a combination of them are often utilized by 
an agency to address wildlife damage on private land. 
Abatement rights and restrictions 
The benefits and costs of regulatory restrictions 
are perhaps the most straightforward to understand. 
The social benefits of restricting abatement are, at best, 
the value of the gray triangle in Fig. 1. It can be shown 
with the mathematical model and the figure that this tri-
angle increases with increases in the marginal value of 
the wildlife affected by the abatement and the marginal 
impact of abatement on the value of the wildlife. There-
fore, despite the costs of enforcement, as these factors 
increase, the value of enforcing abatement restrictions 
increases. 
A special case to consider is that in which the 
potential costs of abatement restrictions tend to be so 
high that they outweigh the total social costs of allow-
ing abatement. To see this, suppose that the problem 
animal was a bear, and the only effective abatement 
method was a rifle. Then consider 2 possible types of 
damage the bear might inflict: personal injury or death, 
or damage to a garbage can. To kill a bear in defense 
of health or life can be represented by a high marginal 
benefit, whereas defense of a garbage can will provide 
less benefit. Relaxing restrictions on shooting a bear 
for personal defense is more likely to be economically 
justifiable than shooting in defense of a garbage can. 
Thus, as the potential costs of abatement restrictions 
increase, such restrictions become less economically 
justifiable.
Specific implications can be drawn from the 
general analysis above. These and subsequent implica-
tions will be phrased in normative terms based on the 
assumption that the objective of wildlife management 
is to maximize the net value of wildlife. These norma-
tive statements can be interpreted in 2 ways: First, if 
wildlife management policy has in fact developed as if 
to maximize the net value of wildlife resources, then 
existing wildlife policy should be generally consistent 
with these implications. Second, if an explicit objective 
of wildlife management is to maximize the net value of 
wildlife resources, then the design of wildlife damage 
policy should reflect these implications. Each of these 
implications apply in ceteris paribus terms; holding 
all else constant. Some of these implications may seem 
self-evident, but this is probably because they are in 
fact reflected in current wildlife damage policy. They 
are included to illustrate the empirical promise of this 
general model. 
Implication 1. Abatement restrictions should 
apply to highly valued wildlife species. 
Implication 2. Abatement restrictions should 
apply for abatement methods that are relatively 
harmful to the wildlife population. 
Implication 3. Abatement restrictions should be 
weak if the value of the resulting increase in 
damage is high. 
Implication 4. Supplementary hunting should be 
promoted if it is productive in terms of damage 
reduction. 
Factors that increase the costs of enforcement 
will, as discussed above, reduce the extent that direct 
abatement restrictions are imposed, or at least the 
extent to which they are effective. Thus the same 
restrictions imposed on landowners (such as restric-
tions on killing game out of season), may be harder to 
enforce for landowners than nonlandowners. Further-
more, Lueck and Yoder (1997) argue that large landown-
ers are likely to internalize more of the effects of their 
abatement and wildlife management activities, so their 
private wildlife use will tend to be closer to efficient, 
and abatement restrictions should tend to be less restric-
tive. 
Compensation 
Compensation for damage from a wildlife man-
ager to a landowner is essentially a form of damage shar-
ing. Compensating a landowner for damage reduces the 
marginal benefit to the landowner of abatement effort. 
To see this, consider the case in which the wildlife 
agency compensates the landowner for 100% of the 
1 The landowner exceptions are in addition to more generally applicable rights 
to defend property, such as additional hunting rights not accorded to non-
landowners. 
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damage sustained by wildlife, as well as any costs the 
landowner accrues as a result of the transaction. The 
landowner will have no incentive to expend abatement 
effort, because he or she gains nothing from it. 
The benefits of compensation, then, result from 
the fact that farmers have a weaker incentive to pursue 
abatement that is potentially harmful to the wildlife 
population. If there were only 1 implementable form of 
abatement for the landowner to use, the efficient level 
of abatement could be induced by setting the compensa-
tion rates such that the effective (post-compensation) 
marginal product of private abatement equals the mar-
ginal cost of private abatement. In the left panel of Fig. 
1, as the compensation rate increases, the MB farmer shifts 
downward. The efficient compensation rate would be 
that which shifted the MB farmer curve downward until it 
crosses MC farmer at xs. 
There is a crucial problem with compensation, 
however. If the landowner utilizes 2 or more abatement 
methods that differ in their impact on the wildlife stock, 
the incentive effect of compensation is a double-edged 
sword. Suppose the landowner privately utilizes 2 abate-
ment methods: 1 that harms the wildlife, and 1 that has 
no effect on the value of the wildlife. Providing compen-
sation, suppose again 100% compensation, will remove 
the landowner’s incentive to perform both kinds of 
abatement. For a given level of savings in terms of the 
value of the wildlife stock, the total damage sustained 
will be higher because the landowner will reduce the 
farmer’s use of both types of abatement, and com-
pensation as a contracting mechanism will be more 
costly. Loosely speaking, the efficiency gains from a 
compensation program are lower if the farmer’s abate-
ment options have highly variable effects on the wildlife 
stock. This is because the compensation mechanism 
does not target abatement effort directly, but only indi-
rectly through its effect on total damage. 
Contracting costs are associated with the mainte-
nance of a compensation program as well. Compensa-
tion is contingent on the level of damage, and requires 
explicit and credible measurement of total damage. The 
process of measuring and verifying the cause of damage 
is not costless, and the aggregate value of a compen-
sation program will be reduced by the cost of mea-
suring damage.2 Measurement costs depend on various 
factors stemming from both the technical process of 
damage measurement, and bargaining and monitoring 
issues between the 2 parties stemming from virtual 
inevitability of imperfect measurement of damage. One 
particularly important determinant of measurement 
costs is heterogeneity of the damaged resource. As het-
erogeneity of the damaged resource increases, the costs 
of calculating damage are likely to increase. Along the 
same lines, damage to annual crops is likely to be easier 
to calculate (more accurately calculated) than change 
to perennials, because the impact of current damage 
on future value of a perennial crop (e.g., the value 
of damage to pine seedlings) will be more difficult to 
ascertain.3 Furthermore, existing markets for an agricul-
tural resource provide information about resource value 
in the form of prices. If a market for a damaged com-
modity does not exist, this increases the difficulty of 
measuring the value of damaged property. Implications 
of the foregoing discussion include: 
Implication 5. Compensation programs should 
target valuable species. 
Implication 6. Compensation programs should 
target individuals who maintain significant con-
trol over the wildlife stock and/or its habitat. 
Implication 7. Compensation programs should 
target homogeneous and annual crops, or other 
property for which damage is relatively easily 
quantifiable. 
Implication 8. Compensation programs should 
target products for which substantial markets 
exist. 
Abatement support and subsidies 
Consider again the 2 forms of abatement dis-
cussed in the previous section on Compensation: 1 form 
that harms the wildlife stock, and 1 form that does 
not. It would appear that the wildlife manager should 
be indifferent to the benign form of abatement, and 
support reductions in abatement that harms wildlife. 
At first glance there is no apparent reason for wildlife 
managers to promote any form of abatement. Yet most 
wildlife agencies provide abatement support of various 
kinds, including consultation services, direct support 
in the form of agency personnel labor, and subsidies 
for various forms of abatement technologies such as 
fencing. 
A plausible economic basis for agency abatement 
support is that different forms of abatement act as tech-
nical substitutes for each other. That is, the use of 1 
form of abatement reduces the marginal productivity 
and leads to a decline in the marginal productivity of 
other forms of abatement when simultaneously applied. 
For example, the installation of a fence for keeping deer 
out of a crop field will reduce the damage-reduction 
benefits that accrue from thinning the local deer popu-
lation in the general attempt to reduce damage. Thus, 
increased use of a benign abatement technology like 
fencing will reduce the incentive that farmers have to 
reduce the local deer population or rely on depredation 
permits in an attempt to reduce crop damage. 
2 These costs are analogous to the “pricing” or “metering” costs as discussed in 
McManus (1975) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), respectively.
3 Other factors affecting measurement costs may include spatial diversity and 
patchiness of crop types.
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Two characteristics of fencing make it an excel-
lent example of an abatement input that might serve 
as a basis for contracting between a farmer and a wild-
life manager. First, its maintenance is relatively easy to 
monitor by both parties. Unlike the farmer’s labor effort, 
its continued existence and maintenance is observable 
at any given time. Second, it has a relatively low impact 
on the wildlife population. As discussed above, the 
installation and maintenance of a fence will reduce the 
incentive that farmers may have to perform abatement 
more harmful to the wildlife stock. If fencing is a pro-
ductive abatement tool, it may therefore be in the best 
interest of a wildlife manager to subsidize the installa-
tion of fencing and monitor its continued maintenance 
by the farmer as part of a contract in order to reduce the 
farmer’s incentive to perform more harmful abatement 
methods. 
Wildlife manager abatement labor on private land 
is another interesting substitute for farmer abatement 
labor effort. There are 2 differences between these 2 
forms of abatement. The wildlife manager has a stake in 
wildlife (if only as an intermediary for hunters and other 
stakeholders), and it is likely to be easier (less costly) 
for a farmer to monitor the wildlife manager’s activities 
on the farmer’s own land than it would be for the wild-
life manager to monitor the landowners activities on the 
farmer’s own land.4 Thus, we can assume that the wild-
life manager will attempt to minimize the impact on the 
wildlife stock as he or she carries out contracted abate-
ment activities under the watchful eye of the farmer. 
It is important to recognize that while different 
abatement inputs may be substitutes for each other, 
they are generally not perfect substitutes. For example, 
landowners are likely able to more effectively address 
damage problems in which timing of abatement is cru-
cial and living on site helps in this process. Fencing 
may not be a very productive abatement input or may 
be prohibitively costly, despite its useful characteristics 
discussed previously. Implications from this discussion 
include the following: 
Implication 9. Abatement programs should pro-
mote agency personnel abatement labor. 
Implication 10. Abatement programs should pro-
mote benign abatement techniques. 
Implication 11. Abatement programs should pro-
mote monitorable fixed abatement capital. 
Joint compensation and abatement programs 
Recall that damage compensation reduces the 
incentives for landowners to carry out all forms of abate-
ment including benign abatement. Thus, compensation 
becomes a costly way of reducing the overall impact of 
private abatement on the value of the wildlife stock. It 
follows that if a wildlife manager maintains a compensa-
tion program, the benefits associated with the support 
of benign and monitorable abatement technologies are 
twofold. First, the use of these inputs further reduces 
the incentive of farmers to pursue more harmful abate-
ment methods due to the substitution effect. Second, 
it directly offsets the compensation’s negative impact 
on the farmer’s private incentive to use benign meth-
ods. Benign, monitorable abatement techniques there-
fore become especially valuable in conjunction with a 
compensation program. An additional implication is: 
Implication 12. Compensation should be contin-
gent on the use of monitorable, benign abatement 
techniques.
DISCUSSION 
The implications of the model outlined in the 
above sections will be discussed in the context of the 
Wisconsin Wildlife Damage and Abatement and Claims 
Program and a broad set of state wildlife regulations to 
show that wildlife damage laws and policy are generally 
consistent with a wealth maximization framework. 
Wisconsin Wildlife Damage and Abatement 
Program 
The Wisconsin Bureau of Wildlife Management 
(BWM) Wildlife Damage Abatement and Claims Pro-
gram (WDACP) incorporates 3 approaches to address-
ing wildlife damage. It provides up to 75% cost-share 
abatement support for farmers through participating 
county agencies, it provides for a depredation permit 
(“hot spot” permit) system that allows landowners with 
special permits to shoot problem deer, and it provides 
compensation up to US$15,000 per farmer per year. 
Farmers sustaining damage by deer, geese, bear, and 
turkey are eligible, and 80 to 90% of estimated damage 
is due to deer. Surcharges on Wisconsin bonus deer 
permit fees earmarked for expenditure on damage 
claims and abatement generated almost US$3.5 million 
in 1996, with almost US$1 million put toward abate-
ment and US$1.7 million toward compensation. For the 
1995 fiscal year, 11.4% of the total departmental budget 
went to the wildlife damage program. Wisconsin’s BWM 
damage estimates in 1996 averaged US$2,813 per claim-
ant (farm), and 1,266 claimants received on average 
US$2,324 in compensation. 
The BWM issued 394 hot spot permits to land-
owners in 1995, under which 3,908 deer were killed 
(as compared to general bow and gun permit kills 
of 467,271). Most crop damage occurs before hunting 
season, which generally is held in late October, and hot 
4 Note that gains from specialization do not necessarily differentiate farmer 
abatement from wildlife manager abatement. “Farmer abatement labor” may 
well be carried out by private abatement specialists, or maybe even by the 
personnel of public agencies not mandated to manage the wildlife popula-
tion.  The important difference is that wildlife manager or their constituents 
are the beneficiaries of benign abatement techniques.
22
HUMAN CONFLICTS WITH WILDLIFE: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
23
spot permits allow farmers (or hunters at the farmers 
request) to shoot deer out of season on land suffering 
crop damage. Issuance of the permit is contingent on 
reasonable prior abatement by landowners and evidence 
of at least US$1,000 of deer damage to crops. The land 
must be open to hunting for the following hunting 
season, and the landowner must also sign a contract 
agreeing not to deny a hunter’s request for access to his 
land unless 2 hunters per 40 acres are already on his 
land at the time of the access request. That the BWM 
issues permits implies that landowners may not kill 
these game species at their own discretion or without 
prior permission. Thus, damage abatement of this form, 
which results in the loss of the value of an individual 
game animal as a hunting target, is restricted (Implica-
tions 1 and 2). 
Although the permits issued to a farmer in a given 
year may all be used by the farmer, the farmer may keep 
only 1 of the deer taken with his or her allotment. Most 
hot spot permits are made available to hunters (Horton 
and Craven 1997). Thus, the value of the deer as game is 
captured by allowing hunters to perform the abatement 
(implication 4). The overall benefits of killing a deer out 
of season may be lower than the benefits accrued from 
hunting during the regular season due to time, location, 
and hunting’s effect on the deer population dynamics. 
Thus, the tradeoff is between the costs of allowing hunt-
ers to harvest out of season and the gains from both 
reduction in damage and reduction in incentives for 
landowners to pursue alternative abatement efforts that 
may harm the wildlife population while not capturing 
any of their benefits. 
When BWM representatives (usually county 
extension agents) assess claims, they usually rec-
ommend the use of abatement techniques. These 
abatement recommendations become requirements for 
receiving compensation, and form the basis of the abate-
ment costs that are shared by the landowner and the 
agency. In addition to hot spot permits, commonly 
implemented abatement methods include the installa-
tion of various types of fencing, the use of lure crops 
and scaring devices, and the application of chemical 
deterrents.
Hot spot permits as a means of marrying hunting 
benefits with damage reduction have already been dis-
cussed. Fencing is a relatively benign form of abatement 
and is easily monitored (Implications 10 and 11). The 
BWM has 15-year written contracts for installation and 
maintenance of permanent fences for deer damage 
abatement, and fences are installed around approxi-
mately 13% of fields for which the BWM provides com-
pensation. As implied by the model, the agency may 
benefit from subsidizing fencing in 2 ways, even if 
the fence has no discernible (or even negative) impact 
on the wildlife population. First, the installation of 
a fence will reduce landowner incentives to perform 
other abatement activities that may be more harmful to 
the wildlife stock. For example, a fence that keeps deer 
out of crop fields will reduce the incentive for farmers 
to shoot deer on sight or clear scrub from around the 
field that may act as valuable (yet inexpensive) forage 
and cover for deer. To put it another way, subsidizing 
a fence to reduce damage provides positive incentives 
to landowners to leave or even promote wildlife habitat 
on their land. Second, when used in conjunction with a 
compensation program, the subsidy will counteract the 
reduction in the incentive to perform abatement that 
the compensation mechanism induces (Implication 12). 
Damage eligible for compensation under the Wis-
consin WDACP includes damage by deer, bears, geese, 
or turkeys. The type of damaged agricultural property 
eligible includes commercial seedlings or crops grow-
ing on agricultural land, harvested crops remaining on 
agricultural land, orchard trees, nursery stock, apiaries, 
or livestock (Wisconsin Code §29.889 (6), 1997-1998). 
Thus, compensation is provided only to those property 
owners  who have control over the resources (land) 
utilized by the valuable game species wildlife (Implica-
tion 6) for damage imposed by valuable game species 
(Implication 5). 
Not only does the BWM provide out-of-season 
hot spot permits, but the farmer is required to allow 
hunting on compensation-eligible land during the open 
season. In 1 of 2 access rules a farmer can choose 
(called the “managed hunting access” plan), the farmer 
must allow up to 2 hunters per 40 acres of eligible 
land to hunt at any given time during the open season.5 
This provision serves a purpose similar to that of hot 
spot permits by promoting abatement by hunters and 
offsetting the disincentive for abatement generated by 
compensation (Implications 4 and 5). The right of land-
owners to control hunter access to their land becomes 
a critical issue for herd management in regions where 
private agricultural land is a major source of wildlife 
habitat (Witmer and DeCalesta 1992, Vander Zouwen 
and Warnke 1994, Gardner 1997, McCabe and McCabe 
1997, McShea et al. 1997a). As with abatement in gen-
eral, compensation reduces a landowner’s incentive to 
allow hunting on his or her land because it reduces the 
cost of wildlife to the landowner. This contract stipula-
tion allows agencies to utilize a compensation program 
to overcome this problem and address access issues 
as well. Furthermore, monitoring this requirement is 
relatively easy. Landowners are included in a list of 
participants that is available to hunters, and are required 
to keep a log of hunters on their land. Hunters have the 
right and an incentive to report to the agency if they feel 
they have been disallowed access. 
5 A hunter may be turned down if he or she is intoxicated, causes property 
damage, or if the hunter does not secure prior permission from the land-
owner (Wisconsin code §29.889 (7M) 1997-1998).  These exceptions are 
consistent with the model as well.
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Table 1: State damage policiesa
ST No permit required Out-of-season depredation permits
 species to defend  issued for to defend carcass owner
AL CY any  game crops
AK pred any pred, BV any
AZ pred lvstck game crops D
CA   DR,EK,BV any LL
CO BR,ML lvstck any any D
CT   any any LL
FL   DR,BR crops
GA   BR bhive
ID BR,ML,WF lvstck any any D
IL   pred,furb any D
IN   any any
IA FH  any  LL
LA BV any any any
ME any lvstck,crp BR bhive D
MD various any
MA any not grass
MI   DR,TE
MN   various any D
MO most any DR,TK,BR
MT pred lvstck BV any D
NE pred lvstck   
NV   furb any D
NH any any
NM any lvstck BV,TE,game
NY   various crops,lvstck D
ND pred,furb any BR,ML any LL
OH   any any D
PA   DR any LL
RI furb any deer crops D
SC BC any any any D
SD   any any
TX   any any LL
UT   BV
VT DR,BR crops   LL
VA FX lvstck various any L
WA any any
WV   DR,BR
WI   DR,BR,WF
WY pred lvstck   LL 
SPECIES: AN=antelope, BC=bobcat, BR=bear, BV=beaver, CY=coyote, DR=deer, EK=elk, FH=hatchery fish, FX=fox, 
GB=game birds, ML=mountain lion, MS=moose, NN=non-native species, PH=pheasant, TE=threatened or endangered, 
TK=turkey, WF=wolf, game=unspecified game, bgame=big game, pred=unspecified predators, various=large specific 
list of various game and/or predators. RESOURCE DAMAGED: any=unspecified property or wildlife, lvstck=livestock, 
bhive=beehive. OWNERSHIP: D=Department, L=landowner, LL=landowner, limited use. ABATEMENT SUPPORT: 
C=consulting, L=abatement labor, K=abatement capital. 
a Data for these tables were taken from state fish and game regulations, Musgrave and Stein (1993) and Wildlife Management 
Institute (1997). 
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Table 2: State damage policiesa
 Contingent on
ST abatement Compensation abate- non- access
 support for (species) ment posting fees
AK C,L,K
AZ C,L BV
CO C,L BR,ML,DR,EK,AN x x x





















VT C,L,K BR,DR x
VA  BR,DR
WA  DR,EK x
WV  BR
WI C,L,K DR,BR,WF x x x
WY  bgame,WF
SPECIES: AN=antelope, BC=bobcat, BR=bear, BV=beaver, CY=coyote, DR=deer, EK=elk, FH=hatchery fish, FX=fox, 
GB=game birds, ML=mountain lion, MS=moose, NN=non-native species, PH=pheasant, TE=threatened or endangered, 
TK=turkey, WF=wolf, game=unspecified game, bgame=big game, pred=unspecified predators, various=large specific list of 
various game and/or predators. ABATEMENT SUPPORT: C=consulting, L=abatement labor, K=abatement capital. 
a Data for these tables were taken from state fish and game regulations, Musgrave and Stein (1993) and Wildlife Management 
Institute (1997).   
State law and regulatory policy 
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of some of 
the wildlife damage and management policies for the 50 
states. Blank spaces indicate that either state statutes or 
written agency policy did not apply to column descrip-
tion for that state, or there was no mention of the 
column topic in any of the sources. The data in these 
tables were spot checked with various agency personnel 
during the course of this research.
Table 1 shows the rights of landowners to take 
(kill) protected species, where protected species are 
those species for which the wildlife manager (wildlife 
agencies) impose a closed season for part the 
year. The second and third columns of Table 
1 entitled, “no permit required for protected 
species lists protected species” that landowners 
may destroy without prior agency permission (Mus-
grave and Stein (1993) and state statutes). 
In general, species that have the potential to inflict 
significant damage in a short amount of time are widely 
represented; livestock predators, for example. In this 
case, the marginal value of a rapid response to depreda-
tion is high and restrictions on rapid response are costly 
(Implication 2). 
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Note that valuable big game species such as deer 
and elk are absent from the second and third columns 
of Table 1 (with the exception of Vermont). The high 
marginal value for hunting of a big game species results 
in large potential loss of value when a big game animal 
is taken for depredation purposes by non-hunters 
(Implication 8).6 Instead, the regulatory response has 
been to allow abatement, but only in a more restricted 
form that both provides discretion on the part of the 
agency and in some cases facilitates the transference 
of “abatement rights” to hunters (columns 3-5 of Table 
1, out-of-season depredation permits. Sources: Mus-
grave and Stein (1993) and state statutes). This way (as 
discussed in the context of Wisconsin), the value of the 
game species as a target for hunters is not entirely lost 
in the process of abatement. 
Some wildlife departments also organize special 
out-of-season depredation hunts in order to address spe-
cific damage problems by game animals such as deer. 
This too acts to address property damage problems 
while capturing some of the benefit of the game animal 
through sport hunting (Implication 11).
Note also that when landowners retain ownership 
of the carcass, there are usually legal limits on its use 
(Table 1, column 6). For example, a deer shot with a 
depredation permit by law might only be used by the 
landowners immediate family. This can be viewed as 
a means to limit the potential value of a game carcass 
in order to reduce incentive for fraudulent requests for 
depredation permits. 
Table 2 focuses on agency abatement and com-
pensation programs. Most state wildlife agencies are 
explicitly authorized by state statute to provide abate-
ment support in the form of consulting, abatement 
labor, and/or abatement capital. State wildlife agencies 
are the regulatory authority over wildlife, but most 
wildlife agencies cooperate with the United States 
Department of Agriculture, Wildlife Services Program 
(WS). In many cases, WS performs much of the damage 
control work. In some cases, particularly with big game 
species, WS activity is monitored by state wildlife agen-
cies (Fagerstone and Clay 1997). In other cases, such 
as with coyote control in many western states, wildlife 
agencies participate little or not at all. In this context, 
WS acts as a representative of agricultural interests, and 
may be a mechanism to internalize the joint interests of 
landowners in dealing with damage. At current popu-
lation levels in the west, the relatively low marginal 
value of an individual coyote in terms of trapping value, 
hunting value, and coyote population health provides 
relatively little incentive to limit lethal abatement tech-
niques (Implication 1).7 
Up to 80% of agencies that provide compensation 
for damage also provided abatement assistance, and 
70% of them tie compensation payments to some form 
of abatement requirements (Wagner et al. 1997).8 In 
some states, compensation is also contingent on allow-
ing hunter access to their land, which reduces the 
local population while providing hunting benefits to 
the public. When access fees are charged by landown-
ers, compensation payments are often reduced by the 
revenues received from charging for access (Wisconsin 
is one state that does this). 
Compensation programs tend to be reserved for 
relatively valuable species (last 2 columns of Table 2, 
and Wagner et al. (1997)). As in Wisconsin, certain 
requirements are usually placed on landowners, such 
as having to follow abatement recommendations of the 
wildlife agency and, for game animals, allowing hunters 
on the land on which damage is occurring. Hypotheses 
regarding abatement and compensation programs dis-
cussed in the previous section in the context of Wiscon-
sin are broadly supported across states. 
As Table 1 shows, Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylva-
nia have compensation programs for livestock depreda-
tion by coyote through their departments of agriculture, 
but in all cases the programs are based on domestic 
dog laws and are paid for out of general county or 
state funds rather than by producers. Compensation 
programs have been discussed at length among sheep 
producers, but apparently no such program has ever 
been implemented that is entirely funded by sheep pro-
ducers (Wagner 1972, p. 46-48). 
If the costs of measuring damage are high, the 
value of a compensation program as a contracting tool 
will be low. The model therefore suggests that com-
pensation programs will be more likely when damage 
measurement costs are low. Many programs specify 
the types of damage that are eligible for compensation 
(Wagner et al. 1997). For example, most or all programs 
for damage by ungulates pay for damage to seasonal 
crops, for which damage to a given crop is relatively 
easy to calculate. Compensation for damage done by 
predators is often limited to livestock losses, and bear 
damage compensation payments are in some cases 
limited to beehive damage. No programs compensate 
for bodily injury, and none compensate for forest prod-
ucts or damage to standing timber or seedlings. Actual 
damage to both of these types of property is likely to 
6 When laws specify which type of agricultural resource can be legally 
defended by non-permit taking, it tends to be livestock and field crops.
7 The growth of the animal rights movement represents an increase in the 
perceived costs of various lethal abatement methods.  The model provides 
implications about the impact of such a change in perceptions, but they will 
not be addressed here. 
8 The data in Table 2 indicate lower percentages than those presented in 
Wagner et al. (1997).  The data in this Table are based primarily on state 
statute requirements, whereas the Wagner et al. (1997) are based on survey 
results.
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be difficult to accurately measure and is therefore less 
likely to be applicable for a compensation program 
(Implications 8 and 12). 
CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the structure of compensa-
tion and abatement programs for addressing wildlife 
damage to agricultural property. In doing so, it provides 
insight into the incentives of both parties for developing 
such contracts, and how participants’ incentives are 
altered in the context of such contracts. It also exam-
ines the costs associated with maintaining such con-
tracts, including measurement costs associated with 
damage assessment for compensation purposes, and the 
costs of monitoring contracted abatement labor. 
The hypothesis that persistent institutions act as 
if to maximize wealth of public or common property 
resources subject to informational constraints and con-
tracting costs has been argued widely (Alchian 1950, Sti-
gler 1992), and in the context of wildlife law and regula-
tory structure more specifically (Lueck 1991, Lueck and 
Yoder 1997). This analysis provides a model and broad 
evidence to suggest that wildlife damage institutions are 
generally consistent with a theory of constrained wealth 
maximization over wildlife resources. 
To the extent that maximization of the net value 
of wildlife resources for all interested parties is an 
explicit objective of wildlife managers, it provides a 
conceptual framework for designing wildlife damage 
and compensation programs to satisfy this objective. 
The model suggests that damage abatement and hunting 
policy should be designed in an attempt to consider the 
resource costs of wildlife populations and the benefits 
of wildlife populations, as well as the relative costs and 
effectiveness of implementing alternative policy struc-
tures.
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